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CLASS CERTIFICATION IN THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS: A
LONGITUDINAL STUDY
STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG*

Think of the class action as a wounded beast – limited in its range of motion,
yet dangerous to those within its reach. . . . Plaintiffs’ and defendants’ class action
lawyers frequently debate the continued vitality of class action practice, the former
decrying their setbacks, the latter reveling in their victories, and both sides
determined to fight on. Academics sift through the rubble of class action
jurisprudence attempting to discern patterns and to predict what lies ahead. Judges
struggle to apply conflicting precedents and fill in gaps, at times reluctantly
surrendering to rigid pronouncements from on high.1
I
INTRODUCTION
We are honored to participate in this issue dedicated to the memory of
Francis McGovern. One of us had the pleasure of knowing Francis for decades
and of watching him in action in some of the many, quite different, roles in which
he excelled. Indeed, Francis’s career in the theory and practice of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) is compelling evidence against the notions that the
field is epistemically shallow and that it offers second-class justice. Both notions
seemed plausible in 1984, when one of us, as Chair of the Association of
American Law Schools (AALS) Section of Civil Procedure, solicited Owen Fiss
to write the paper that became Against Settlement.2 As others have observed, and
as was evident to anyone who watched Francis in action, he was at the same time
creative and committed to evidence-based solutions. Aspiring to live up to his
example in those respects, we offer this Article, which is part of a larger body of
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1. Donald R. Frederico, The Arc of Class Actions: A View from the Trenches, 32 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REV. 266, 266 (2020).
2. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). See Owen M. Fiss, The History of
an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273, 1276 (2009) (recounting the origins of Against Settlement).
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work that seeks to deploy the insights of multiple disciplines and a multi-method
research strategy to cast light on, and dispel myths about, litigation procedure.
Fittingly, our subject is class actions.
There is a vast literature on the modern class action, but little of it is informed
by systematic empirical data.3 In the absence of such data, commentators seeking
to characterize trends in class action activity or class action jurisprudence often
rely on their sense of the lay of the land, citing decisions that support their view.4
These characterizations sometimes sweep broadly, ignoring possible differences
among courts deciding class certification issues. Moreover, they are necessarily
the children of the times when they were made Thus, even if accurate for the
period characterized, they may no longer be accurate. In this Article we present
the first longitudinal picture of class certification on the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
In earlier empirical work we traced a legal movement among conservative
activists, business groups, and the Republican party, from the first Reagan
administration through 2014. That movement attempted to retrench both existing
opportunities and incentives to enforce federal rights through private lawsuits.
We found that, among federal lawmakers, the Supreme Court proved most
effective in changing legal rules salient to private enforcement.5 We also found
that in the mid- to late-1990s, in private enforcement cases in general and Federal
Rules decisions in particular, the Court became increasingly likely to rule in an
anti-plaintiff direction. In addition, the justices’ voting behavior became
increasingly ideologically polarized.6
When we examined the role of the Court in retrenchment of class actions in
particular,7 the picture that emerged was at times consistent with the larger
canvases we painted. Yet, although the Court was generally pro-private
3. See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, Class Certification and Class Settlement:
Findings from Federal Question Cases, 2003–2007, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 315, 339 (2011) (“There have been
very few empirical studies of class actions in general . . . .”); id. at 330; Jonah B. Gelbach & Deborah R.
Hensler, What We Don’t Know About Class Actions But Hope to Know Soon, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 65,
67 (2018) (“[I]t is remarkable how few basic facts about class actions we actually know.”); Deborah R.
Hensler, Happy Fiftieth Anniversary, Rule 23! Shouldn’t We Know You Better After All This Time?, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1615 (2017) (“[W]e face a virtual absence of even the most basic information on
how class actions operate in federal and state courts.”).
4. But not always. For an illuminating qualitative empirical study of class actions, see DEBORAH
R. HENSLER, NICHOLAS M. PACE, BONNIE DOMBEY-MOORE, ELIZABETH GIDDENS, JENNIFER
GROSS, & ERIC MOLLER, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN
(2000).
5. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 130 (2017) (“When acting under Article III
rather than as a delegated lawmaker under the Rules Enabling Act, the Court has been far more
successful than either Congress or the rulemakers in changing the law that governs private
enforcement.”).
6. See id. at 153–55, 175–76.
7. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against Federal
Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2017). Although our criteria in creating the Supreme Court data set
specified that decisions in Federal Rules cases should turn on interpretation of a Federal Rule where the
result would either widen or narrow opportunities or incentives for private enforcement, we also included
cases that turned on an issue explicitly linked to the policies underpinning Rule 23. See id. at 1517.
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enforcement (both in general and in all Federal Rules cases) in the 1960s and
1970s,8 that was not the tenor of its class action decisions during this time.9 In
addition, although the Court’s class action jurisprudence seemed to align with the
anti-plaintiff movement and growing polarization in its other private
enforcement decisions starting around 1995, toward the end of the study period
(2014) the Court issued a number of decisions rejecting positions advanced by
advocates of retrenchment.10
The growing polarization between conservative and liberal justices that we
found in our retrenchment studies, which was greatest in Federal Rules cases,11 is
akin to that which other scholars have found in studying the Court’s business
decisions.12 This is not surprising given that in recent decades disputes involving
business have dominated its Federal Rules private enforcement cases.13 In our
prior work, we suggested that the speculative explanation offered by other
scholars for the phenomenon in business cases may also apply in Federal Rules
cases.14 That is: liberal justices in the minority reacted to their conservative
colleagues in the majority pushing the envelope in the pro-business/anti-private
enforcement direction in cases where the arguments for doing so were ever more
contestable.
From this perspective, it would not be surprising if interest groups and
defendants seeking retrenchment in Federal Rules cases, which have become
much more active in filing amicus briefs in recent decades,15 having enjoyed
success before, continued to push the envelope. Nor would it be surprising if such
efforts occasionally caused conservative judges and justices to refuse to go
further. A leading scholar of class actions has suggested that some of the Supreme
Court’s and circuit courts’ recent pro-class action decisions (and denials of
certiorari) can be regarded as backlash against “overly aggressive advocacy by
defendants.”16 Perhaps so, although they may simply serve as another reminder
8. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 5, at 152–55 (all private enforcement cases); id. at 173–
75 (Federal Rules cases).
9. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 7, at 1520 (“From 1969 . . . through the end of the 1970s, the
clear preponderance of outcomes was anti-class action . . . .”).
10. See id. at 1523.
11. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 5, at 175.
12. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme
Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1469 (2013) (“[T]he increasing conservatism of the Court resulted in the
Court’s taking cases in which the conservative position was weaker than previously, leading to more
opposition by liberal Justices and hence to a higher percentage of liberal votes by those Justices in
business cases.”).
13. See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 5, at 176.
14. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 7, at 1521–22.
15. See id. at 1524–26.
16. Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions Part II: A Respite from the Decline, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 971,
974 (2017); see id. at 981 (suggesting that the Court has “become numb” to the “blackmail pressure to
settle” argument and that “the business community has suffered a lack of credibility in its amicus
strategy”); id. at 991 (noting that “defendants had virtually no success in selling their interpretation of
Comcast to the circuits”); id. at 992 (observing that “the impact of [Wal-Mart] has been less profound
than one might have predicted when it was decided in 2011”). Professor Klonoff described these
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that ideology alone cannot explain judicial decisions: the law itself, as courts
understand it, constrains judicial independence.
Our prior work thus sought to fill only a small part of the empirical vacuum
about class actions in the federal courts by gathering and analyzing data on the
Supreme Court’s class action decisions that are salient to private enforcement of
federal law. But the Court decides few such cases, and there have been long
periods when the lower federal courts were left to fend for themselves. Moreover,
until recently, very few of the Court’s class action decisions concerned the
standards for class certification.17 The centrality to private enforcement of the
legal question whether class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 has long been obvious. The paucity of decisions on
certification should caution against the tendency, common among academics, to
attribute legal change to the Court. Empirical research has revealed that the
lower courts may not wait for the Supreme Court to do what they think needs to
be done. That was true, for example, with summary judgment.18
Sometimes, but only sometimes, the Court leads. Sometimes it follows. The
press of other business for the limited spaces on a small docket not only means
that there may be long intervals between the Court’s decisions in a discrete area.
It also means that the Court lacks the resources regularly to police compliance
with those decisions it does make. Differences in the forces that shape case
selection by the Supreme Court and the docket of the courts of appeals can
explain why there may be little discernible relationship between empirical trends
at different levels of the federal judicial hierarchy. Other possible reasons include
institutional differences that constrain or enhance the ability of judges to wield
influence, and the fact that both panels and circuits may have policy preferences
and institutional concerns that are not aligned with the Supreme Court.
Mindful that there were few Supreme Court class certification decisions in
our earlier studies, and that they may not provide an accurate picture of class
action jurisprudence (let alone class action activity) over time, we launched a
project to fill a larger part of the empirical vacuum. To that end, we created a

developments as “a welcome change from years of court decisions curtailing class actions.” Id. at 975. Cf.
Andrew J. Trask, Reactions to Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Litigation Strategy and Legal Change, 62 DEPAUL L.
REV. 791, 816 (2013) (“[T]he [Wal-Mart] opinion is not so much a rollback as a correction in a constantly
shifting game, in which both plaintiff and defense lawyers are arguing for new applications of class action
rules.”).
17. Between 1969 and 1982, the Court decided seventeen cases involving either an interpretation of
Rule 23 or consideration of the policies underlying Rule 23, not one of which required decision of a
certification issue. It decided the first such case in 1982 (Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982)),
the second in 1997 (Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)), and the third in 1999 (Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999)). There followed another long interval before the Court finally
paid sustained attention to certification issues, commencing in 2010 (Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010)).
18. See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases:
Drifting Towards Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 620–21 (2004) (discussing
empirical evidence that summary judgment “started to assume a greater role in the 1970s” rather than as
a result of the Supreme Court’s 1986 trilogy).
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comprehensive data set of class certification decisions in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals.
The first article to emerge from this project explored the association between
the party of appointing president, gender and race of court of appeals judges, and
votes and outcomes on class certification issues.19 We found that the ideological
composition of the panel (proxied by the party of the appointing president) has
a very strong association with certification outcomes. All-Democratic panels
have dramatically higher rates of certification than all-Republican panels—
nearly triple in about the past twenty years. We also found that the presence of
one African American on a panel, and the presence of two females (but not one),
is associated with pro-certification outcomes. Except for splitting the data into
two roughly equivalent time periods in some of our models, that article did not
seek to identify trends in appellate class certification activity or law over time.
We now turn to that endeavor. In Part II, through a literature review, we
identify both prior empirical scholarship and commonly asserted claims
concerning federal class action activity and jurisprudence over time. These
ground some of the propositions that we test with our data. Descriptive
presentations of those data suggested additional propositions that might usefully
be tested.
In Part III we present our data and explore the light they shed on class action
certification decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Our findings suggest that
final-judgment appeals, at least in precedential decisions, played a larger role in
this landscape prior to Rule 23(f) than has often been asserted or assumed, and
that in all decisions since 2002 they continue to play a major role. We also find
that final-judgment appeals involving Rule 23(b)(3) issues are common, which
casts doubt on the conventional wisdom concerning the class certification
decision as the death knell for plaintiffs or defendants.
Our findings of significant variation over time in appeal outcomes post-Rule
23(f) suggest the hazards of generalizing experience under that Rule in any
particular period. They demonstrate that, for reasons about which we can only
speculate, interlocutory appeals since 2000 have elicited more ideological
behavior, leading to greater polarization. Finally, our findings show that, contrary
to conventional expectations, in the period since Wal-Mart20 and Comcast,21
plaintiffs have been winning certification appeals more frequently than they were
formerly, and Rule 23(f) contributed to this recent success.

19. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Politics, Identity, and Class Certification on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 119 MICH. L. REV. 231 (2020).
20. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
21. Comcast v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013).
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II
THE EXISTING LITERATURE: DATA AND CLAIMS
A. Rule 23(f)
Studies of the class action decisions of the courts of appeals that are based on
systematically collected data have focused on Rule 23(f).22 This provision
authorizes a party who has suffered an adverse decision on a motion for class
certification to petition for interlocutory review of that decision. It also
authorizes the courts of appeals to grant or deny permission to appeal in their
sole discretion.23 Securing appellate review of adverse class certification decisions
was said to be difficult before its promulgation,24 and it was asserted that few
litigants had the means (in the case of plaintiffs) or the appetite for risk (in the
case of both plaintiffs and defendants) to persevere to a final judgment.25
Statutory authority for interlocutory appeals is limited. The main hope for such
review of class certification decisions requires the approval of both the district
court and the court of appeals.26
In the 1970s a number of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, led by the Second
Circuit, adopted the so-called death knell doctrine in order to permit
interlocutory review of some decisions denying class certification, at the behest
of plaintiffs who could not continue to litigate in the absence of a certified class.27
22. See, e.g., Carey M. Erhard, A Discussion of the Interlocutory Review Of Class Certification
Orders Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 151 (2002); Richard D. Freer,
Interlocutory Review of Class Certification Decisions: A Preliminary Empirical Study of Federal and State
Experiences, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 13 (2007); Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion:
Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175 (2001); William Kolasky &
Kevin Stemp, Antitrust Class Actions: More Rigor, Fewer Shortcuts, 30 CLASS ACTION REPS. 1 (2009);
Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note on Law and Discretion in the Courts of
Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277 (2008); John H. Beisner, Jessica D. Miller & Geoffrey M. Wyatt, Study Reveals
US Courts of Appeal Are Less Receptive to Reviewing Class Certification Rulings, SKADDEN, ARPS,
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/
2014/04/study-reveals-us-courts-of-appeal-are-less-recepti [https://perma.cc/SNJ8-FUKL].
23. “A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action
certification under this rule. . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). This provision represented the only Rule 23
amendment to emerge from a decade of work by the Advisory Committee in the 1990s. See Burbank &
Farhang, supra note 7, at 1514–15.
24. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Gould, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f): Interlocutory Appeals of Class
Action Certification Decisions, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 309, 312 (1999) (claiming that “appellate
review of certification decisions was limited or effectively nonexistent in most class actions”); Alon
Klement & Robert Klonoff, Class Actions in the United Stated and Israel: A Comparative Approach, 19
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 151, 163 (2018) (“Prior to 1998, it was very difficult to appeal a decision
granting or denying class certification . . . .”).
25. See, e.g., Willging & Lee, supra note 3, at 324 (noting “the conventional wisdom that the denial
of a motion to certify signals the death knell for a proposed plaintiff class and the grant of a motion to
certify a litigation class forces the defendant to settle”).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
27. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966). The Second Circuit, apparently
alone, also permitted interlocutory review of certain adverse class certification decisions by defendants
under the so-called reverse death knell doctrine, but it “established several conditions severely limiting
its use” before the Supreme Court put an end to the entire enterprise. Kenneth A. Cohen, “Not Dead
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The Supreme Court put an end to that practice in 1978,28 as it did to entertaining
interlocutory appeals under Section 1292(a) in putative class actions seeking
injunctive relief.29
Thereafter, in the absence of a final judgment, if review could not be obtained
under Section 1292(b), the only available avenue was a writ of mandamus. The
perception in the 1990s that some courts of appeals were using this extraordinary
writ for purposes beyond its limited remit was one of the cited reasons for
proposing Rule 23(f). The perceived inability of the courts of appeals to
superintend class action doctrine was another.30
Rule 23(f) is facially neutral. Many predicted at the time it was being debated,
and asserted after it was promulgated, however, that it would (or did)
disproportionately benefit defendants.31 Although the published studies of
experience under Rule 23(f) vary in many respects, until recently they appeared
largely to confirm such predictions and assertions. In the years studied, when the
courts of appeals granted review under Rule 23(f), they were more likely to
reverse a grant of certification and more likely to affirm a denial of certification.32
Until recently, none of the published Rule 23(f) studies extended beyond
2012. Only one of them, ending in 2006, presented data on petitions for review as
well as on decisions in cases in which review was granted.33 Decisions on petitions
for review are usually not memorialized in opinions of any description.34 An
unpublished study by a law firm working for the Chamber of Commerce’s
Institute for Legal Reform sought to supplement the earlier study by compiling
data on petitions for review and dispositions of cases granted review from
October 1, 2006 through 2013. It concluded that courts of appeals granted
petitions for review far less frequently in the later period (2006–2013) than in the
earlier one (1998–2006), with the rate of granted petitions falling from 36% to
22.9%. Additionally, most of that decline was attributable to petitions filed by

But Only Sleeping”: The Rejection of the Death Knell Doctrine and the Survival of Class Actions Denied
Certification, 59 B.U. L. REV. 257, 261 (1979).
28. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 471 (1978).
29. See Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) Advisory Committee Note to 1998 amendment.
31. See, e.g., Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1357, 1358 (2003) (“Circuit courts began protecting defendants as soon as the amendment took
effect. A plaintiff who prevails on a certification motion in a trial court must expect to lose on appeal.”).
Professor Silver noted that he “argued against the interlocutory appeal amendment when the Rules
Committee met in Dallas, Texas in 1996.” Id. at 1358 n.6. His assertion about what plaintiffs must expect
on appeal relied on a 2003 assessment of decided cases finding “that no federal circuit has used 23(f)
appeal to reverse denial of class certification.” Id. at 1358 n.8.
32. See, e.g., Sullivan & Trueblood, supra note 22, at 286 n.43; Beisner et al., supra note 22.
33. See Sullivan & Trueblood, supra note 22.
34. See id. at 277 (quoting Judge Diane Wood, who observed that “[t]he vast majority of our rulings
on 23(f) motions are not published”); id. at 284 (noting “only 10% of the ‘decisions’ accepting or rejecting
a Rule 23(f) petition are available by searching published or electronically available opinions” and “the
rest—90%—are reflected only in docket entries . . . [where] the court’s reasoning may not be provided”).
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defendants, for which the grant rate across all circuits declined from 45% to
24.8% (compared to a decline from 22% to 21% for plaintiffs).35
In an April 2014 memorandum describing the study, lawyers at Skadden
observed that, although “it remains more likely for grants of class certification to
be reversed on appeal than to be affirmed; and more likely for denials of class
certification to be affirmed rather than reversed,” plaintiffs “have seen greater
success with Rule 23(f) appeals than in previous years.” Thus, although the
affirmance rate for grants of class certification remained essentially stable
(increasing from 29% to 30%), the reversal rate for denials increased from 29%
to 40%.36
The authors of the 2014 memorandum reasoned that their findings “are
concerning for defendants because low [petition] grant rates in certain circuits
may signal to district courts that they are unlikely to be reversed . . . which could
lead some of these courts to push the boundaries of their discretion in ruling on
class certification.” They expressed particular concern about the Ninth Circuit,
“where defendants filed 157 Rule 23(f) petitions and only 23 were granted.”
Warning that “particular attention must be paid to meritless class actions” in such
circuits, the lawyers suggested as “[o]ne potential strategy for class action
defendants . . . to focus appellate courts on the need to interpret recent U.S.
Supreme Court class action jurisprudence.” They continued:
In contrast to the U.S. Courts of Appeal, the Supreme Court has expressed a greater
willingness to hear class certification cases in recent years. The last few years have
produced a host of Supreme Court rulings on class action issues, including Wal-Mart
Stores v. Dukes, Amgen v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, and Comcast v. Behrend.
The recent Supreme Court decisions may provide an opportunity for class action
litigants seeking appellate review to argue that further appellate interpretation is
needed, particularly where a trial court relies on pre-[Wal-Mart] and pre-Comcast
appellate precedents in granting class certification.37

Finally, in connection with Rule 23(f), Professor Bryan Lammon recently
completed a study of petitions for review and merits decisions for the period of
2013–2017.38 Observing that decisions on granted Rule 23(f) petitions alone do
not give an accurate picture of how plaintiffs and defendants fare under Rule
23(f), Lammon concludes that, for the period studied, the difference in grant rate

35. Beisner et al., supra note 22. A commentator synthesizing the two studies observed: “[From 1998
to 2006], 75 percent of the 23(f) petitions decided were from grants of certification and 25 percent from
denials. [From 2006 to 2013], however, 61 percent of the 23(f) petitions decided were from grants of
certification and 39 percent from denials.” Daniel B. Rogers, Rule 23(f) After 16 Years, 34 APP. PRAC.
12, 17 (2014).
36. Beisner et al., supra note 22.
37. Id. For an assertion suggesting that litigants agreed that “further appellate interpretation [wa]s
needed,” see Frank Burt & Michael Kentoff, Class Action Developments After Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes
(Jul. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), Lexis SU004 ALI-ABA 1049 (claiming that interlocutory review
of commonality issues increased after the Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart decision). They may not, however,
have been defendants. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
38. Bryan Lammon, An Empirical Study of Class-Action Appeals (Apr. 20, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript)
(available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3589733
[https://perma.cc/6AZR-PFZ5]).
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as between plaintiffs (21%) and defendants (27%) is “only weak evidence that
it’s the petitioning party that is driving the decision to grant a Rule 23(f)
petition.”39 Moreover, his data reveal that the courts of appeals reversed both
grants and denials of class certification about 54% of the time, with statistical
analysis yielding the conclusion that the “numbers thus provide essentially no
evidence that courts favor defendants over plaintiffs in the Rule 23(f)
context . . . .”40 When the outcomes of both petitions and certification merits
decisions are considered, and “[g]iven that defendants file about 50% more
petitions than plaintiffs do[,] . . . plaintiffs have more total victories in the Rule
23(f) context [57%] than defendants do [43%].”41
Professor Lammon’s study is important. His data do not, however, enable him
to completely fulfill the goal of “assess[ing] the rule’s criticisms.”42 In
summarizing assessments of Rule 23(f) by supporters and critics since it became
effective, he cites articles published in 2001, 2002, 2010, 2013, 2014, 2015, and
2017, among others.43 Many of the assessments in question predated the activity
reflected in the data on which his study relies (let alone their availability). Had
those assessments been based on contemporaneous data, they might have been
accurate. It would require a longitudinal study of both petitions and merits
decisions to reach a conclusion on that question.
Whatever its significance “in the Rule 23(f) context,” denial of a petition for
review does not necessarily represent “total victor[y]” on the issue of class
certification.44 An appeal from such a decision may be available after a final
judgment, or in the case as a whole. As previously observed, the conventional
wisdom has been that few litigants have the resources or the appetite for risk to
proceed to a final judgment after an adverse class certification decision in the
district court.45 Yet, not all class actions seek damages and certification under
Rule 23(b)(3), and class action lawyers need not always rely on the prospect of a
common fund to finance the litigation. Even after class certification in damages
class actions, there may be alternatives to settlement or trial, including a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or a motion for summary judgment.46 Finally, as

39. Id. at 5.
40. Id. at 28.
41. Id. at 45–46.
42. Id. at 5. See id. at 45 (arguing that data provide “little or no support for the popular criticisms of
Rule 23(f)—that it favors defendants”).
43. See id. at 3 nn.5–7, 17 n.66, 18 nn.67–70, 19 n.71 and accompanying text.
44. Id. at 45.
45. In 2017, the Supreme Court eliminated one technique—voluntary dismissal with prejudice—
that some plaintiffs’ class action lawyers used in order to secure an immediate appeal while (hopefully)
preserving class claims if the certification decision were reversed. See Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S.
Ct. 1702 (2017).
46. See Willging & Lee, supra note 3, at 324 (“Given the conventional wisdom . . . we expected this
figure [(57.6% of cases with class certified settled)] to be much higher . . . . The defendants may prevail,
for example, at summary judgment or at trial [or prevail on a Rule 23(f) appeal].”); id. at 326 (discussing
a case in which, following certification, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant,
leading to an appeal by the plaintiff); Hensler, supra note 3, at 1604 (“[M]any charges about the negative
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Professor Klonoff observed in 2016, “the scope and sheer number of recent class
action trials constitutes an important new trend.”47
Considering the volume of class certification decisions, the literature contains
many claims that the courts of appeals decided more class certification issues
following the promulgation of Rule 23(f) in 1998.48 Yet, the picture of appellate
review prior to 1998 that emerges from the literature is far from clear, with
commentators differing on such questions as: the incidence of review under the
death knell doctrine by courts that permitted it prior to 1978, the utility of 28
U.S.C. §1292(b) to secure interlocutory review,49 and the role of mandamus.
Some of the inconsistencies are likely due to changes in the mechanisms available
to secure interlocutory review over time, including both the addition or
subtraction of a particular mechanism (for example, the death knell doctrine) and
the impact such changes had on attitudes towards other mechanisms (for
example, mandamus).50
B. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)51 is primarily a jurisdictional
statute. Some of its supporters, whose real agenda was retrenchment (rather than,
as claimed, protecting state lawmaking prerogatives), hoped that channeling
state-law class actions into federal court would materially reduce the probability
of certification, if not through denial of certification by district courts, then on
appellate review (as putatively augmented by Rule 23(f)).52

consequences of class actions, such as the assertion that the risks of class actions are so great that they
force defendants to settle non-meritorious claims—so called ‘blackmail settlements’—rest on empirical
assumptions about the pattern of disposition of class complaints, which have gone largely untested.”).
47. Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A Prognosis, 65 EMORY L.J. 1569, 1645
(2016).
48. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 732–33
(2013) (arguing that Rule 23(f) increased the number of certification decisions being reviewed by federal
appellate courts).
49. See Roger Bernstein & Daniel Berger, Recent Developments in Private Antitrust Class Actions,
24 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 819, 852 (1979) (finding some success in appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b));
David C. McDonald & Jeffrey N. Ostrager, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice, 1979 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
535, 567 (finding review of certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) rare because class certification
decisions usually involve only discretionary considerations and do not involve controlling questions of
law).
50. See Federal Civil Appellate Jurisdiction: An Interlocutory Restatement, 47 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1984, at 13, 202 (finding that, after Livesay, more appellate courts began to accept review
of certification decisions via writs of mandamus). Compare Bernstein & Berger, supra note 49, at 852
(“Mandamus has been a universally unsuccessful mode of seeking review of class certification
decisions.”), and McDonald & Ostrager, supra note 49, at 567 (finding that writs of mandamus were
consistently denied because they are limited to cases when district court judges clearly abuse their
discretionary power), with Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in Whoville: Rule 23(f), A Good Rulemaking, 69
TENN. L. REV. 97, 101 (2001) (arguing that appellate review of class certification via writs of mandamus
became increasingly popular in the 1990s).
51. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715.
52. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1448–49, 1530 (2008); Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on
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In a study undertaken shortly after CAFA was enacted,53 researchers at the
Federal Judicial Center (FJC) found “a dramatic increase in the number of
diversity class actions filed as original proceedings in the federal courts in the
post-CAFA period.”54 Perhaps assuming that this documented increase would
translate into a similar increase in the courts of appeals, a number of scholars
have claimed that the volume of class certification appeals increased after
CAFA.55 We are aware of no empirical studies that support such claims. Having
completed Phase I and started Phase II of the contemplated study, the FJC
researchers apparently turned to other projects. As a result they did not, in the
end, “analyze the litigation activity in the sampled cases in the courts of
appeals.”56
C. The Class Action Jurisprudence of the Courts of Appeals
As is evident from our discussion of Rule 23(f) empirical studies, claims about
that Rule include both its effect on the volume of class certification appeals, and
how plaintiffs and defendants have fared when it was invoked. These studies
ignore final-judgment appeals, perhaps regarding them as trivial in number. None
of the studies purports to characterize the impact of the courts of appeals’ class
action jurisprudence as a whole on plaintiffs and defendants. Yet, as we show
below, final-judgment appeals comprise about half of all appeals between 2002
and 2017. Thus, their absence from existing studies significantly limits the
inferences that can be drawn from them. In the absence of reliable empirical data,
commentators have been left to their own devices in making claims about the
tenor of that jurisprudence.
In a famous article surveying the early history of amended Rule 23, Professor
Miller claimed that, following an initial period of optimism about the effects of
the rule on the quest for justice, the courts of appeals were more skeptical of class

the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1942–43, 1951–52
(2006).
53. The FJC undertook a “long-term study of the impact of [CAFA] on the resources of the federal
courts . . . designed to examine three phases of class action activity: filing and removal of cases; litigation
in the district courts; and appellate review.” Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, The Impact of the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 on the Federal Courts: Third Interim Report to the Judicial Conference
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, FED. JUD. CTR. 1 (Apr. 2007), https://www.fjc.gov/content/impactclass-action-fairness-act-2005-third-interim-report-judicial-conference-advisory-0
[https://perma.cc/EJ6A-9JFH].
54. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
on the Federal Courts: Fourth Interim Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, FED. JUD. CTR. 1 (Apr. 2008), https://www.fjc.gov/content/impact-class-action-fairness-act-2005federal-courts-fourth-interim-report-judicial-0 [https://perma.cc/7GDD-3ABC]. The results for diversity
class actions removed to federal court were different, with an increase in the immediate post-CAFA
period followed by a return to “levels similar to those in the pre-CAFA period.” Id. at 2.
55. See Klonoff, supra note 47, at 733 (claiming that appellate review increased after CAFA).
56. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas Willging, Progress Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
on the Impact of CAFA on the Federal Courts, FED. JUD. CTR. 1 (Nov. 2007), https://www.fjc.gov/content/
progress-report-advisory-committee-civil-rules-impact-cafa-federal-courts-0 [https://perma.cc/6YGXGXJG].
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actions. This period lasted from 1969 to 1973 or 1974, during which there were
many interlocutory appeals that stabilized “various aspects of rule 23 practice.”57
Others writing about the first few decades of experience under Rule 23 remarked
on the difficulty of identifying clear trends, arguing that circuits varied in their
receptivity to class actions.58
Scholars seem to have reached consensus, however, that in the decade
preceding the promulgation of Rule 23(f), the courts of appeals were more likely
to reverse than to affirm class certification orders. They differed, however, on the
significance of the phenomenon they posited. Some suggested that the appellate
courts were merely insisting on the rigor that the Supreme Court had called for
in 1982,59 and “rein[ing] in overzealous grants” of certification.60 One scholar
posited an “antiplaintiff bias among federal appeals judges,” a majority of whom
had been nominated by Republican presidents.61
Writing in 2016, Professor Klonoff asserted that the courts of appeals used
their increased opportunities under Rule 23(f) to erect “significant roadblocks to
class certification.”62 In the same article, however, he noted that some courts of
appeals had resisted broad interpretations of the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Wal-Mart and Comcast.63 Even more recently, he suggested that such decisions
may reflect a backlash against overreaching by defendants or interest groups
seeking further retrenchment of class actions.64
Finally, Professor David Marcus reported the results of his analysis of every
reported class certification decision in a federal public interest case between June

57. Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein, Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class
Action Problem”, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 678, 679, 682 (1979).
58. See Bernstein & Berger, supra note 49, at 852–53 (attempting to identify a trend based on the
“emerging state of the law on interlocutory appeals”); David Marcus, Erie, The Class Action Fairness
Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1284,
1305 (2007) (reporting conflicting views among lawyers as to whether federal judges or state judges are
more likely to grant certification); Andrew A. Wittenstein, Recent Development: The Rebuttable
Presumption That Sherman Act Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Class Certification Under Rule 23, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 177, 187 (1976) (arguing that “it is difficult to note any clear trends” in receptivity to class
actions).
59. See Mark S. Adams, Developing Class Action Strategies Based on Recent Key Decisions, in
LITIGATING PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLASS ACTIONS: LEADING LAWYERS ON INTERPRETING RECENT
DECISIONS, ASSESSING A CASE’S VALIDITY, AND PREPARING FOR TRIAL *12 (Aspatore Books 2011),
Westlaw 5617993 (claiming that, as part of a steady trend that began with the Supreme Court’s decision
in General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982), federal appellate courts are “increasingly
probing plaintiff’s [sic] claims and defendant’s [sic] defenses to determine whether a class should be
certified”).
60. See Freer, supra note 22, at 14 (citing one appellate court case in support); see also Erhard, supra
note 22, at 155 (noting that mandamus review was rare and usually used to decertify classes and citing
four cases in support of this proposition).
61. Marcus, supra note 58, at 1304.
62. Klonoff, supra note 47, at 1623–24.
63. See id. at 1613, 1618. We follow Professor Klonoff in focusing on Wal-Mart’s holding concerning
commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), recognizing, of course, that the Court in that case also rendered an
important holding concerning the proper interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2).
64. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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21, 2011 and March 31, 2020. Having noted his pessimism after the first three
post-Wal-Mart appeals resulted in decertification orders,65 he continued:
But a hard pro-defendant turn in the doctrinal regulation of the public interest class
action has not materialized. Since the last of the three initial cases, the federal circuits
have decided 22 additional appeals involving the propriety of class certification.
Plaintiffs have won 17 of these cases. . . .66

Rejecting the notion that such success reflects “‘narrowing from below’—of
lower federal courts fashioning a less intrusive interpretation of Wal-Mart to
blunt its impact,” he argued that “Wal-Mart’s demand for ‘rigorous analysis’ has
forced lawyers and judges to articulate with more precision the contours of the
substantive rights that [certain types of] plaintiffs vindicate.”67
Klonoff and Marcus have in common a recognition that changes in appellate
panels’ certification behavior over time may be a function of changes in the
quality of cases they are deciding. This in turn may be a function of parties
changing behavior in response to changes in the law, such as the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Wal-Mart and Comcast.68 It is also likely that appellate panels are
responding to changes in law in ways that lead them to decide comparable cases
differently after a change in law than they did before. For example, they may be
seeking to faithfully implement Supreme Court decisions, or to counteract
Supreme Court decisions with which they disagree. We will not be able to
untangle the multiple causal forces that may be at play. In light of all this
complexity, our ambition is to offer a descriptive account of certification over
time, not a causal one.
III
LONGITUDINAL PATTERNS IN CERTIFICATION DECISIONS
In our study, we examine both published and unpublished decisions. With
respect to published (precedential) decisions, we endeavored to build a
comprehensive dataset of U.S. Court of Appeals panel decisions addressing
whether a class should be certified from 1966 (when the modern Rule 23 became
effective) through 2017.69 With respect to unpublished (nonprecedential)

65. See David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 781 (2016).
66. David Marcus, The Persistence and Uncertain Future of the Public Interest Class Action, 24
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 395, 409 (2020). See also Klonoff, supra note 47, at 1591 (“Overall, despite some
setbacks, the cases give reason for some optimism. [Wal-Mart], no doubt, will pose obstacles in some
cases, but the fact that important cases seeking structural relief continue to be certified is encouraging.”).
67. Marcus, supra note 66, at 417.
68. Even before those Supreme Court’s decisions, a number of Courts of Appeals had substantially
enhanced the evidentiary requirements for class certification. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust
Litigation, 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008); In re IPO Securities Litigation, 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
69. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 19, at Appendix, Part I.A, for further details on data
collection. As discussed in the Appendix to this Article, our data include certification decisions with
respect to settlement classes. Our data do not, however, include en banc decisions, of which there were
only sixteen during the study period.
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decisions, we collected the same data from 2002 through 2017.70 In total, we
identified 1,344 certification decisions.
Of course, published court of appeals decisions differ from unpublished
decisions in important respects, and published decisions are not representative of
all litigated cases.71 We can learn from both types of decisions. We are interested,
in part, in the creation and development of law. Published court of appeals
opinions are the vehicle through which circuits create and develop law that is
binding on all subsequent panels and on all district courts in the circuit, while
unpublished decisions have no precedential weight. In one set of models we will
examine only published opinions.
We are also interested in the full universe of decided certification appeals. In
addition to the possible unrepresentativeness of published decisions with respect
to judicial behavior, there may be other selection processes at play when
analyzing only published opinions. The same judges that render decisions in
published opinions also decide whether the decisions will be published. This
threatens to confound inferences about the relationship between explanatory
variables and case outcomes when one studies only published decisions. Thus, we
70. The E-Government Act of 2002 required that federal circuits make opinions publicly available,
allowing them to be included in commercial databases. According to Professor Andrew T. Solomon, the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ unpublished decisions were not consistently made publicly available until
2003 and 2005, respectively. See Andrew T. Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A
Recipe for Ethical Problems & Legal Malpractice?, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 205–06 (2007) (“By 2005,
every federal circuit released the full-text of its unpublished opinions.”). Our models that include
unpublished opinions account for this. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 19, at Appendix, Part I.A.
While this article was in production, we became aware of forthcoming work that found fewer of
certain types of appeals on commercial databases than the number reported by the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts, casting doubt on the U.S. Courts of Appeals’ compliance with the E-Government Act
of 2002. See Merritt E. McAlister, Missing Decisions, 169 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). Although
Professor McAllister’s valuable study raises the specter of “serious sampling bias risks for empirical work
at the circuit-level using commercial databases,” id. (manuscript at 56), it is not evident how his findings
relate to our data. She studies only “terminations,” which would appear to exclude many, if not most,
certification decisions. Id. (manuscript at 2 n.9). Further, McAllister examined the nature of missing
cases only in the First Circuit, where 67% were criminal, and 49% were pro se. Id. (manuscripty at 54).
Although she does not report the percentage of missing cases with counseled civil plaintiffs, the forgoing
percentages are consistent with the number being zero or miniscule. Consistent with this possibility,
McAllister also found, again in the First Circuit, that “only a handful (if any) of these missing decisions
involve the kinds of complex civil disputes that others have frequently observed receive the most
attention from the federal appellate courts.” Id. (manuscript at 54); see id. (“none appeared to involve
cases that had proceeded to oral argument”). Although class actions (always civil, infrequently pro se,
and often complex) would appear not to be the type of case for which McAllister finds evidence of
noncompliance with the E-Government Act of 2002, such noncompliance cannot be foreclosed without
more evidence. Future empirical investigation will be necessary to reach confident conclusions. Finally,
we note that this issue is not pertinent to what we report on published cases.
71. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court
System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 526–27 (1989) (arguing that the consideration of published appellate
decisions compared to district court activity creates “two different pictures” of the federal court system);
David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit,
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 843 (2005) (finding a distinction in outcomes of asylum cases between published
and unpublished cases); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 71–75 (2001) (describing the
“debate . . . over the role of unpublished opinions in the federal system”).
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also examine models of published and unpublished decisions restricted to the
circuit years for which we have complete data on both. In those models,
unpublished decisions comprise about one-third of the cases. For the most part,
but not always, the results look very similar to what we observe when analyzing
only published decisions.
Our dependent variable is whether a decision is pro- or anti-certification. In
order to code it, the certification analysis in each decision was read in full. We
code a decision as pro-certification (=1) if the court of appeals affirms the trial
court’s certification, reverses the trial court’s decision not to certify and directs it
to certify, or reverses the trial court’s decision not to certify and remands for
further proceedings on certification. We code a decision as anti-certification (=0)
if the court of appeals affirms the trial court’s decision not to certify, reverses the
trial court’s decision to certify and directs that a class not be certified, or reverses
the trial court’s decision to certify and remands for further proceedings on
certification.
A. Certification Over Time
1. The Volume of Final-Judgment and Interlocutory Appeals.
Figure 1 displays regression estimates of counts of all decisions and separately
shows final-judgment appeals versus interlocutory appeals. The number of total
published decisions grew steeply beginning in 1967, peaked in the late 1970s, and
declined over the course of the 1980s and 1990s until the turn upward that
followed the addition of Rule 23(f). Because the regression curve smooths over
year-to-year fluctuations, it does not reveal sharp breaks in the data, and thus the
raw underlying data are instructive. Inspecting the raw counts indicates that the
post-Rule 23(f) counts began to grow in 2000. In the 1990s there were an average
of twelve published decisions a year addressing certification; the number grew to
twenty-two in 2000–2009 and to thirty-two in 2010–2017. By 2017, the estimated
number of published decisions matched its peak in the late 1970s.
Interlocutory appeals comprised 14% of published decisions prior to 2000
and 57% of them from 2000–2017. In the domain of precedential decisions, finaljudgment appeals dominated interlocutory appeals, comprising 86% of published
decisions prior to 2000.72 Although this is consistent with conventional wisdom
that securing interlocutory review was difficult during this period, we lack data
on unpublished decisions prior to the addition of Rule 23(f), and thus we do not
know the fraction of total appeals that were interlocutory during that period. We
also lack data on the frequency with which interlocutory review was sought,
which would be important to assessing the difficulty of securing it.

72. In published cases prior to 1998 (when Rule 23(f) came into effect), 86% of the appeals were
final-judgment, 8% were interlocutory under Section 1292, 2% were interlocutory under a writ of
mandamus, and an additional 3% were interlocutory but without the court identifying the jurisdictional
basis.

06_BURBANK & FARANGH (DO NOT DELETE)

88

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

6/21/2021 4:00 PM

[Vol. 84:73

Figure 1. Number of All Decisions, Final Judgment v. Interlocutory

We can say with confidence that interlocutory appeals were responsible for
the lion’s share of the growth in published certification decisions following Rule
23(f). The trajectory of growth is also evident when unpublished decisions are
added to the analysis from 2002–2017, during which time they constitute about
one-third of the total in our data. During this period the decisions were fairly
evenly balanced between interlocutory and final-judgment appeals.73
2. The Volume of Certification Appeals with Federal, State, and Combined
Federal/State Causes of Action.
Figure 2 displays estimated counts of decisions separated by whether
certification was sought as to a class asserting only a federal claim, only a state
claim, or both federal and state claims. Because courts often fail to state the basis
of jurisdiction, we found that claims in federal court under CAFA could not be
reliably coded. However, such claims would be encompassed within cases seeking
certification of state claims only. A substantial majority of published decisions on
certification prior to 2005 were in cases seeking certification of federal claims
only. After 2005, the number of decisions in cases seeking certification of state
claims only grew threefold. In published and unpublished decisions in 2002–2017,
certification decisions on state law-only classes grew more strongly, increasing

73. In published and unpublished decisions from 2002–2017, 49% were final-judgment appeals.
Approximately 50% were interlocutory and cited Rule 23(f) as the jurisdictional basis or (in a small
fraction of cases) cited no jurisdictional basis, which we assume arose under Rule 23(f). In only 2% did
the court cite only § 1292 as the jurisdictional basis for an interlocutory appeal, and none cited mandamus.
Some of this 2% may have actually arisen under Rule 23(f). The Supreme Court promulgated Rule 23(f)
pursuant to § 1292(e), which provides that “The Supreme Court may prescribe rules . . . to provide for
an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for under
subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d).” Thus, at least some courts regard Rule 23(f) appeals as arising under §
1292, e.g., Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2006), and it
is possible that some courts cite only § 1292 in a 23(f) appeal. It is clear that in the 2002–2017 period the
vast majority of interlocutory appeals were under Rule 23(f).
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fivefold and becoming as frequent as certification decisions on classes asserting
only federal claims.
Figure 2. Number of Decisions: Federal Law Only, State Law Only, and Federal
and State Claims

3. Interlocutory Appeals and Rule 23(b)(3) Versus (b)(2) Classes
We also examined whether the growth in availability of interlocutory review
had a disproportionate impact on the proportion of appeals addressing (b)(2)
versus (b)(3) classes. The notion that prior to Rule 23(f) parties would settle
rather than litigate after a district court certification decision was particularly
focused on damages classes under (b)(3). If this dynamic were at play, we would
expect to see that (b)(3) classes are more likely to appear in appeals under
interlocutory versus final-judgment review.
We found that opinions do not reliably identify the type of class for which
certification is sought under Rule 23(b). This is especially true when the issues on
appeal concern application of Rule 23(a). However, we can gain some insight
from issues that appeared in the certification analysis. Coders identified whether
opinions addressed the (b)(3) requirements of predominance and superiority,
and whether they addressed (b)(2) requirements for an injunctive class. The
percentage of such decisions that appeared in final-judgment and interlocutory
appeals in published and unpublished opinions from 2002–2017 is displayed in
Table 1, as is the information broken down by appeals by defendants only and
appeals by plaintiffs only.
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Table 1. Percentage of Final-Judgment versus Interlocutory Appeals in (b)(3)
and (b)(2) Classes
All
Defendant
Plaintiff
Cases
Type of Appeal
Appeals
Appeals
(b)(3) Final-Judgment
33%
40%
35%
(b)(3) Interlocutory
(b)(2) Final-Judgment
(b)(2) Interlocutory

57%
10%
14%

58%
15%
15%

53%
7%
13%

Final-judgment appeals of certification decisions with respect to (b)(3) classes
are far from aberrant. They occurred in 33% of the decisions—40% of those
appealed only by defendants. This casts doubt on the notion that parties are
rarely willing to litigate through to final judgment once a district court has
certified or declined to certify a class. It is true, however, that (b)(3) issues are
materially more likely to appear in interlocutory than final-judgment appeals.
They were addressed in more than half of the interlocutory appeals in our data.
We acknowledge, of course, that without knowing the size of the population of
district court decisions on (b)(3) issues, we cannot know the rate of either type of
appeal from the universe of potentially appealable decisions.74
Appeals of decisions on whether to certify an injunctive class are much less
frequent events. The difference in their frequency in final-judgment versus
interlocutory appeals is small in absolute terms. They occurred in 10% of finaljudgment appeals and 13% of interlocutory appeals. There was no difference in
the frequency with which they appeared across the two types of appeals when
only the defendant appealed. When only the plaintiff appealed the percentage
grew from 7 to 12—significant in relative terms (a 71% increase) but small in
absolute terms (a 5-percentage point increase).
4. Probability of Reversal in Interlocutory Versus Final-Judgment Appeals
Much of the empirical literature on Rule 23(f) has focused on comparing rates
of reversal by courts of appeals in cases in which the district court certified as
compared to when it denied certification. These studies treated the data crosssectionally within blocks of time. Figure 3 shows rates of reversal of district court
grants and denials of certification for published and unpublished opinions from
2002–2017. We focus only on this period because we want to compare reversals
of grants versus denials of certification in all (not just published) interlocutory
appeals, and to compare the results to those in final-judgment appeals.
74. We considered the possibility that the percentage of (b)(3) final-judgment appeals may be
materially affected by plaintiff-objector challenges to (b)(3) settlements, since approval of a settlement
is a final judgment and plaintiff-objectors may challenge certification after that order is entered. This is
not the case. The percentage of cases presenting each type of appeal is the same or nearly so when
settlement classes are excluded: 33% are (b)(3) final-judgment, 57% are (b)(3) interlocutory, 9% are
(b)(2) final-judgment, and 14% are (b)(2) interlocutory. Again, these numbers are based on cases in
which the court actually reached a (b)(2) or (b)(3) issue.
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Figure 3. Reversals by the Courts of Appeals of District Court Grants &
Denials of Certification

In interlocutory appeals, the estimated probability of reversal of a district
court grant of certification had been climbing steeply in the years before WalMart, from 52% in 2002 to 71% in 2010. At the time Wal-Mart was decided,
defendants had a very high rate of success in using interlocutory review to reverse
grants of certification. After Wal-Mart the trend reversed. The probability
declined precipitously by 39 percentage points to 32% in 2017. The pattern for
reversals of denials of certification is less clear. It vacillated before Wal-Mart and
showed no clear trend after it.
The figure makes clear that, prior to Wal-Mart, interlocutory appeals were far
more frequently used to reverse grants of certification than to reverse denials. If
(as some have suggested) this was the intended result of some advocates of Rule
23(f), the evidence is consistent with their hopes for about a decade after Rule
23(f) appeals began to grow in 2000. From 2002 to 2010, the average annual
probability of reversing a grant was 64%, and the probability of reversing a denial
was 35%. However, by the end of the series it had become slightly more likely
that a denial of certification would be reversed as compared to a grant.
In final-judgment appeals, we observe a similar pattern of growth in the
estimated probability of reversing a grant of certification at the beginning of the
series, followed by a long decline. However, the decline begins earlier (in 2008),
although it appears to have steepened after Wal-Mart. The size of the decline
from the peak to the end of the series is 20 percentage points (about half the size
of the 39-percentage point decline observed in interlocutory appeals). The
probability of reversal of district court denials of certification was very low and
fairly stable before Wal-Mart, averaging 14% from 2002–2010. It then turned up
and rose to 27% by 2017, about doubling.
The figure makes clear that prior to Wal-Mart, as with interlocutory appeals,
final-judgment appeals were far more frequently successful in reversing grants of
certification than denials. From 2002 to 2010, the average annual probability of
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reversing a grant was 40%, as compared to the 14% probability of reversing a
denial. As with interlocutory appeals, by the end of the series it had become
slightly more likely that a denial of certification would be reversed as compared
to a grant.
5. Probability of Pro-Certification Outcomes by Partisan Majority
Figure 4 displays the probability of a pro-certification outcome in all cases,
and in cases with Democratic- versus Republican-majority panels. We limit the
data in published decisions to 1970–2017 because in the first several years of our
data, there are too few cases to provide meaningful estimates of outcomes. In
published decisions, there was a long-run, gradual decline in the estimated
probability of a pro-certification outcome. The probability declined from 46% in
1975 to 39% in the mid-1980s, where it remained relatively flat for two decades
before turning upward around 2007. It grew 21 percentage points by 2017, ending
the series with a 58% probability of certification—the highest in the forty-eight
year series.
Although Democratic- and Republican-majority panels started the 1970s
with a clear gap between them, the gap narrowed, and Democratic- and
Republican-majority panels were relatively close from the mid-1970s to the late1990s. The gap widened significantly at the end of the 1990s, at the same time
that Rule 23(f) came into effect. The widening gap between Democratic- and
Republican-majority panels also corresponds temporally to findings in our prior
work: that in about the mid- to late-1990s (1) there was a growing focus in the
Republican Party on restricting opportunities and incentives for private civil
actions in general, and class actions in particular, (2) Congressional Republicans
introduced a growing number of anti-class action bills, (3) important advocacy
groups associated with the Republican Party, specifically including business
groups and conservative law reform organizations, elevated their focus on
curtailing class actions, and (4) Supreme Court justices became more polarized
along ideological lines in their voting on Rule 23 issues.75

75. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 7, at 1524–28 (arguing that civil litigation retrenchment
generally and class action retrenchment in particular “became a more salient issue in the Republican
Party, and the locus of more partisan conflict,” beginning in the 1990s).

06_BURBANK & FARANGH (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2021]

CLASS CERTIFICATIONS IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS

6/21/2021 4:00 PM

93

Figure 4. Outcomes in All Decisions & Democratic v. Republican Majorities

Surprisingly (to us), the distance between Democratic- and Republicanmajority panels stabilized after around 2010, when the probability of a procertification outcome on Republican-majority panels began to grow steeply
alongside that of Democratic-majority panels. The gap between them was an
average of 23 percentage points from 2011 to 2017. At the end of the series, when
in the posture of making law, both Democratic- and Republican- majority panels
were at their highest probability of pro-certification outcomes in the forty-eight
years covered by the data.
When unpublished decisions are added for the period of 2002–2017, the
pattern is similar. Democratic- and Republican-majority panels are close
together at the start, but the gap is already growing, with Republican-majority
panels moving in an anti-certification direction. After about 2010 the probability
turns upward for Republican-majority panels, and both types of panels grow
increasingly likely to render pro-certification outcomes through the end of the
series. They remain separated by an average of 23 percentage points from 2011
to 2017.
6. Probability of Pro-Certification Outcomes by Certification Issue
It is natural to wonder whether outcome patterns vary depending on the
specific class action issues addressed by the court. Comcast is typically seen as
taking a restrictive approach to predominance, and Wal-Mart is widely regarded
as making commonality more difficult to satisfy.76 Figure 5 displays the
probability of a pro-certification outcome separately for decisions in which (1)
the court addressed an issue of commonality, (2) the court addressed an issue of
predominance, and (3) the court evaluated certification but addressed neither
issues of commonality nor predominance. The third category is limited to cases

76. See, e.g., id. at 1522-23.
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that had no logical connection to the features of the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Wal-Mart and Comcast that divided the Court and elicited controversy.
Figure 5. Outcomes by Certification Issues Addressed

Viewing published decisions from 1970 to 2017, the presence of a
commonality issue was associated with growing rates of pro-certification
outcomes over the course of the three decades prior to the 2011 Wal-Mart
decision. Rather than declining after Wal-Mart, the rate of pro-certification
outcomes escalated more rapidly through the end of the series. In 2017, there was
a 71% probability of a pro-certification outcome—a high point in the forty-sevenyear series. The presence of a predominance issue was associated with declining
rates of pro-certification outcomes from 1970 to 2000. Outcome rates were stable
through 2005, and then escalated sharply by 21 percentage points to 54% in 2016
(before declining slightly in the last year). The probability of a pro-certification
outcome in 2017 was equivalent to the probability in 1970.
In certification decisions that did not address either commonality or
predominance issues, the probability of a pro-certification outcome declined
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, was stable until 2000, and increased by 18
percentage points through the end of the series. In 2017, there was a 52%
probability of a pro-certification outcome, a high point in the series. In all three
sets of cases the probability was rising prior to the Wal-Mart and Comcast
decisions and continued rising to new heights after them.
When unpublished decisions are added to the analysis for 2002–2017, we
observe some noteworthy differences at the end of the series. The upward
trajectory in pro-certification outcomes in decisions with commonality issues
continued growing through Wal-Mart in 2011. It peaked (at 60%) in 2015, but
then declined to 50% in 2017. The previously growing rate of pro-certification
outcomes in decisions addressing predominance issues plateaued at 46% for the
three years following Comcast, and then declined by 5 percentage points in 2017.
Viewing the two panels of the figure together, the plateau and/or decline in procertification outcomes for decisions presenting commonality and predominance
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issues during the post-Wal-Mart and Comcast period is not present in decisions
through which circuits are electing to make law. It appears to be driven by
declining probability of pro-certification outcomes in unpublished decisions.
Thus, when all appeals are pooled in 2002–2017, the bivariate story is one of
growing probability of pro-certification outcomes in cases presenting
commonality or predominance issues prior to the Wal-Mart and Comcast
decisions, and an arrest or reversal of that growth following the decisions.
However, the passage of four years between Wal-Mart and the decline in
probability of a pro-certification outcome in cases presenting a commonality
issue certainly gives one pause in attributing the decline to Wal-Mart. With
respect to Comcast, the arrest in the growth pattern is more proximate in time to
the decision. In contrast, in cases presenting neither commonalty nor
predominance issues, the probability of a pro-certification outcome was stable at
about 25% for the five years leading up to Wal-Mart in 2011, and then it more
than doubled to reach 55% by 2017 with no plateau or decline.
B. Empirical Models
We use statistical models to further examine the relationship between
outcomes in certification decisions, partisan majorities, interlocutory appeals,
and post-Comcast certification outcomes. The models allow us to test the
statistical significance, conditional on important control variables, of certain
patterns that we observe in the bivariate figures. A key focus in the models is
temporal change. We include an indicator variable measuring pre- and postComcast decisions. We are interested in the general question of whether plaintiffs
seeking certification fared worse on appeal after Wal-Mart and Comcast, and the
period after Comcast is the period during which both decisions were in effect.77
We also include a linear time trend variable.
In the model of published decisions from 1967 to 2017, we include an indicator
variable distinguishing the 1967–1994 period from the 1995–2017 period. As
documented in our prior work, noted above, the mid-to-late 1990s saw increasing
hostility towards and polarization surrounding class actions and Rule 23 issues
from congressional Republicans, business groups, conservative law reform
organizations, and some Supreme Court justices.
In addition to these temporal variables, we include variables indicating
whether an appeal was interlocutory and whether the panel was majorityDemocrat or majority-Republican. In one set of models, we include interactions
between the partisan majority variable, the variables measuring whether the
appeal was interlocutory, and whether it was post-Comcast. These interactions
allow us to evaluate whether the effect of ideology on the probability of a pro77. When one includes both post-Wal-Mart and post-Comcast indicator variables in the same model,
the post-Comcast variable is consistently significant, and the post-Wal-Mart variable is consistently
insignificant. Thus, the statistical models indicate that the March 2013 breakpoint, when Comcast was
decided, better explains the growth in pro-certification outcomes than June 2011, when Wal-Mart was
decided.
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certification outcome was different in interlocutory appeals or after Comcast.
Finally, the models also include a battery of control variables that is detailed in
the Appendix, including circuit fixed effects, policy area, direction of the district
court decision, numerous case characteristics, and the racial and gender
composition of the panel.
1. Interlocutory and Post-Comcast Appeals
We initially examine models with the main effects of the variables described
above, without the partisan majority interactions. In our model of published
decisions over the full period of 1967–2017,78 the post-Comcast variable is
significant and positive. It is associated with a 22-percentage point growth in procertification outcomes, increasing the probability from 40% to 62%. The year
variable is significant and negative, associated with a reduction of one percentage
point a year in the probability of a pro-certification outcome. Thus, conditional
on many controls, when panels were making precedential decisions there was a
long-run gradual negative time trend in the probability of a pro-certification
outcome, with a sharp reversal to a substantially increased probability in the postComcast period.
The probability of a pro-certification outcome is 37% for Republicanmajority panels and 50% for Democratic-majority panels, for a 13-percentage
point swing.79 The 1995 dummy variable is insignificant, indicating that
conditional on other variables in the model (including the linear time trend and
post-Comcast variable), there was no statistically significant post-1994 change in
the probability of a pro-certification outcome. Finally, whether an appeal is
interlocutory is not significantly associated with a pro- or anti-certification
outcome.
Turning to the model of all (published and unpublished) decisions in 2002–
2017,80 the Democratic-majority and post-Comcast variables remain significant
with both a larger party magnitude and a smaller post-Comcast magnitude, as
compared to published decisions from 1967 to 2017. Democratic majorities are
19 percentage points more likely to produce pro-certification outcomes.
Republican-majority panels do so at a rate of 28%, and Democratic-majority
panels do so at a rate of 47%. In the post-Comcast period, the probability of a
pro-certification outcome grew by 13-percengate points, from 31% to 44%. The
time trend variable and the interlocutory variable are both insignificant in this
model.

78. Infra Appendix, Table A-1, Model A.
79. We find much larger party effects when we compare panels with more specific partisan
configurations (like all-Democrats versus all-Republicans). See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 19, at
260–61. In this Article we use only the party majority variable in order to facilitate the party majority
interactions with the post-Comcast period and the interlocutory variable.
80. Infra Appendix, Table A-1, Model B.
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2. The Relationship between Party and Interlocutory Appeals.
We next add interaction terms of the interlocutory variable with whether the
panel had a Democratic majority, and the post-Comcast variable with whether
the panel had a Democratic majority.81 These interaction variables tell us whether
party has a distinctive association with outcomes (1) in interlocutory versus noninterlocutory decisions, and (2) in the post-Comcast versus pre-Comcast period.
This answers the question whether judges were more or less ideological in
interlocutory decisions and in the post-Comcast period.
We first examine the model of precedential decisions from 1967 to 2017.82 The
interaction of the Democratic-majority and interlocutory variables disaggregates
the variables into four possible combinations: final-judgment/Republican
majority, final-judgment/Democratic majority, interlocutory/Republican
majority, and interlocutory/Democratic majority. The predicted probabilities are
displayed in Table 2. In final-judgment appeals, Republican-majority panels have
a 41% probability of pro-certification outcome. This grows to 48% on
Democratic-majority panels. In interlocutory appeals, the probability for
Republican-majority panels declines from 41% to 29%. On Democratic-majority
panels, it increases from 48% to 56%. The gap between Republican- and
Democratic-majority panels grows from only 7% in final-judgment appeals to
27% in interlocutory appeals. This difference is statistically significant.
Table 2. Predicted Probabilities of Pro-Certification Outcome by Appeal Type
& Partisan Majority, Published Cases 1967–2017
Rep. Majority
Dem. Majority
Final Judgment
41%
48%
Interlocutory
29%
56%
We see parallel results in the model of all decisions in 2002–2017 with the
interactions included. The predicted probabilities are displayed in Table 3.
Again, Republican-majority panels have a lower probability of pro-certification
outcomes in interlocutory as opposed to final-judgment appeals (although the
difference is small), and Democratic-majority panels have a higher probability of
certifying in interlocutory than in final-judgment appeals. Democratic-majority
panels are more likely to certify than Republican-majority panels by 12
percentage points in final-judgment appeals. This gap grows substantially to 26
percentage points in interlocutory appeals.
Table 3. Predicted Probabilities of Pro-Certification Outcome by Appeal Type
& Partisan Majority, Published & Unpublished Cases 2002–2017
Rep. Majority
Dem. Majority
Final Judgment
30%
42%
Interlocutory
26%
52%

81. Infra Appendix, Table A-1, Models C & D.
82. Infra Appendix, Table A-1, Model C.
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We conclude that court of appeals judges vote more ideologically in
interlocutory appeals. We cannot explain with confidence why this is so. It may
be that granting interlocutory review selects cases with characteristics (such as
the size of the stakes, or legal indeterminacy) that elicit more ideological voting,
or it may be that the presentation of the certification issue early in the litigation
as opposed to post-final judgment does so, or both. Whatever the mechanism,
this result shows that Rule 23(f) contributed to the growing distance between
Republican- and Democratic-majority panels beginning in around 2000. The
number of interlocutory appeals grew sharply after Rule 23(f) went into effect
(Figure 1). Interlocutory appeals were associated with more ideological voting,
and Democratic- and Republican- majority panels grew more distant in their
probability of pro-certification outcomes (Figure 4).83
3. The Relationship between Party and Post-Comcast Certification
The interaction of the post-Comcast variable with the Democratic-majority
variable is clearly insignificant in both the 1967–2017 model of published
decisions and the 2002–2017 model of all decisions. This result shows that the
large post-Comcast growth in probability of pro-certification outcomes was not
distinctively driven by Democratic- or Republican-majority panels. Both saw a
comparably large magnitude of growth in their probability of pro-certification
outcome after Comcast. It was a co-partisan development, as reflected in Figure
4.
4. The Relationship Between Post-Comcast Certification and the Rule 23
Certification Issues Presented
Although Wal-Mart’s focus was on commonality and Comcast’s was on
predominance, thus far in evaluating the post-Comcast effect we have not been
distinguishing between issues presented. We examined a series of models in
which we interacted the post-Comcast variable with issue variables measuring
whether the court addressed (1) predominance or commonality, (2)
predominance but not commonality, and (3) commonality but not predominance.
We did so in both the 1967–2017 model of published decisions, and the 2002–2017
model of all decisions. These interactions test whether the designated issues have
a distinctive relationship with outcomes post-Comcast that is not captured by the
main effects of the issue variables and the post-Comcast variable. The
interactions were all clearly insignificant.84 Predominance and commonality
issues, as compared to other issues, did not have an association with outcomes

83. This does not mean, however, that Rule 23(f) is the sole cause of the growing distance between
Democratic- and Republican-majority panels in the 2000s. When we examine a version of Figure 4 based
only on final-judgment appeals, we continue to see clear evidence of a widening distance between
Democratic- and Republican-majority panels. Thus, Rule 23(f) contributed to, but does not by itself
explain, the marked growth in ideological voting on certification issues in the 2000s.
84. We added these variables to infra Appendix, Table A-1, Models C & D. This is also true of cases
presenting a commonality issue when we use a post-Wal-Mart (instead of post-Comcast) dummy variable
and its interaction with the commonality issue variable.
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post-Comcast that was statistically distinguishable from the pre-Comcast period.
The post-Comcast growth in probability of certification cut across issue areas and
clearly extended beyond predominance and commonality.
Finally, we noted when discussing the figure of outcomes by issue type
(Figure 5) that the 2002–2017 bivariate data on both published and unpublished
decisions looked consistent with a post-Comcast arrest in the previous upward
trajectory in the probability of pro-certification outcomes in cases presenting
commonality and predominance issues (but not other issues). However, the
models with controls that we just discussed tell us that decisions that addressed
commonality and predominance issues were not statistically distinguishable from
those that did not. It is certainly possible that, if we had more post-Comcast years
of data, we would detect that the post-Comcast growth in probability of procertification outcome for this subset of cases is statistically distinguishable from
other issue areas.
5. The Relationship Between Post-Comcast Certification and Direction of
District Court Decision
As we have discussed, some have suggested that in the wake of Wal-Mart and
Comcast, defendants were emboldened to overreach by pressing weaker
arguments for denial of certification, and that plaintiffs elevated the quality of
their advocacy for certification.85 Such changes in the quality of defendants’ and
plaintiffs’ positions in the post-Comcast period could explain the post-Comcast
growth in probability of a pro-certification outcome on the courts of appeals. This
may have happened because defendants pressed weaker arguments on appeal
when certification was granted in the district court, or because plaintiffs pressed
stronger arguments on appeal challenging denial of certification in the district
court. It is also possible that, independent of such party selection effects, trial
courts on average interpreted Wal-Mart and Comcast in a more anti-certification
direction than that preferred by the courts of appeals. This would produce an
elevated probability of reversing certification denials (where the plaintiff wins)
and a declining probability of reversing certification grants (where the defendant
wins). Our data cannot adjudicate among these causal theories.
We can, however, explore some aspects of the data implicated by these
theories. Figure 3, depicting rates of reversal over time, showed that in the postWal-Mart and Comcast period defendants achieved lower rates of reversal of
certification, and plaintiffs achieved higher rates of reversal of denials of
certification. The former is consistent with appellate panels’ perception that
defendants were bringing weaker appeals, and the latter is consistent with their
perception that plaintiffs were bringing stronger appeals.
We now test whether the relationship between the direction of the district
court decision (grant or denial of certification) had a statistically distinguishable
relationship with the probability of reversal after Comcast, as compared to

85. This could, of course, include not pursing certification at all in weaker cases.
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before. We do so in the same statistical model with controls used to estimate
outcomes (described above and in the Appendix), but we use reversal (as
opposed to outcome) as the dependent variable. We run this model only on
decisions that were appealed by only the defendant, or only the plaintiff (92% of
the cases), dropping cases in which both plaintiff and defendant appealed, or
objectors or intervenors appealed (8% of the cases, primarily with objectorappellants). We do this to allow a clear interpretation that reversals of
certification are defendant wins, and reversals of denial of certification are
plaintiff wins. In alternative specifications we ran the reversal models on all cases,
regardless of appellant, and the results were nearly identical.
The battery of independent variables in the model includes the direction of
the district court outcome (grant versus denial), the post-Comcast variable, and
their interaction. The interaction captures whether the direction of the district
court outcome had a distinctive association with probability of reversal in the
post-Comcast period. The interaction was statistically insignificant in the model
of published decisions in 1967–2017, but it was highly statistically significant (with
a very large effect) in the 2002–2017 model of all decisions.86
The interaction of the district court outcome and the post-Comcast variable
disaggregates the variables into four possible combinations: Pre-Comcast/District
Court (DC) denial of certification, Pre-Comcast/DC grant of certification, PostComcast/DC denial of certification, and Post-Comcast/DC grant of certification.
The predicted probabilities of reversal associated with each combination are
presented in Table 4. In the pre-Comcast period, the courts of appeals were 23
percentage points more likely to reverse when reviewing a grant of certification
as compared to a denial of certification. Defendants were far more likely to
secure reversal.
Table 4. Predicted Probabilities of Reversal by Pre- and Post-Comcast &
District Court Outcome, Published & Unpublished Cases 2002–2017
DC Denial
DC Grant
Pre-Comcast
27%
50%
Post-Comcast
42%
42%
In the post-Comcast period this large defendant advantage vanished. Panels
had the same probability of reversing grants and denials of certification. Moving
from pre- to post-Comcast, plaintiffs’ probability of securing reversal of a denial
of certification grew from 27% to 42% (a positive movement of 15 percentage
points), while defendants’ probability of securing reversal of a grant of
certification declined from 50% to 42% (a negative movement of 8 percentage
points). Thus, the model results indicate that the larger share (about two-thirds)
of the movement in court of appeals reversal behavior that erased defendants’
prior 23-percentage point advantage came from cases in which defendants had

86. Infra Appendix, Table A-1, Models E & F.
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persuaded the trial court to deny certification, but the court of appeals found
their position wanting.
Our finding that plaintiffs and defendants secured reversal at an
indistinguishable rate post-Comcast in all appeals (both interlocutory and finaljudgment) is in general accord with Professor Lammon’s conclusion, in his study
covering 2013–2017, that courts of appeals reversed grants and denials at the
same rate in Rule 23(f) appeals that reached the merits.87 However, the radically
different results for the pre-Comcast period highlight the dangers of ignoring
time. Relative reversal rates across grants and denials changed dramatically over
time and may well do so again in ways that we cannot now anticipate. General
inferences about who benefits from or is disadvantaged by the greater frequency
of appellate review under Rule 23(f) are not warranted by our data.
Who benefits from more frequent appellate review appears to be quite
contingent. It is likely contingent on the behavior of the parties and the way they
respond to changes in the legal environment. The overreach hypothesis proposed
by Professor Klonoff suggests that in the post-Wal-Mart and Comcast period,
defendants pressed weaker arguments both before district courts and on appeal,
leading to an increasing plaintiff win rate.88 Professor Marcus adds the possibility
that in the same period plaintiffs’ lawyers elevated the quality of their advocacy
for certification, leading to an increasing plaintiff win rate.89 Another potential
factor is that trial courts adopted a more anti-certification interpretation of WalMart and Comcast than did the courts of appeals, increasing the plaintiff win rate
on appeal. Indeed, it may be that the courts of appeals read Wal-Mart and
Comcast more narrowly than would be preferred by the majorities in those cases.
These views, of course, are not mutually exclusive. Our data are consistent with
each and cannot adjudicate among them. Perhaps ironically (given advice on
behalf of the Chamber of Commerce90), Rule 23(f) was an important weapon that
plaintiffs wielded to beat back some success that defendants enjoyed before trial
courts in the aftermath of Wal-Mart and Comcast.91
The possibility of these dynamics highlights another caution in our ability to
draw the inference, from comparable win rates, that plaintiffs fare as well as
defendants under Rule 23(f) in the post-Comcast period. The arguments of
Klonoff and Marcus suggest a more general point: the average quality of
arguments presented by defendants versus plaintiffs may vary systematically over
time in response to changes in the legal environment, such as changes in appellate
law and legal strategy in the defense or plaintiffs’ bar. This would confound the

87. Lammon, supra note 38, at 45 (“the rates at which courts grant Rule 23(f) petitions for plaintiffs
and defendants are similar, and the rate of reversal is more or less the same.”).
88. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
89. See supra text accompanying note 67.
90. See supra text accompanying note 37.
91. In the post-Comcast period, of plaintiff appeals from district court denials of certification that
were reversed, 53% were interlocutory. We do not suggest that plaintiffs’ post-Comcast gains came only
in interlocutory appeals, but rather that such appeals contributed amply to them.
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notion that comparable win rates mean that courts are being evenhanded as
between plaintiffs and defendants. If the defendant (or plaintiff) side
systematically presses weaker arguments and succeeds at the same rate as the
plaintiff (or defendant) side that is making stronger arguments, they are doing
better, not the same. Regrettably, this is but one instance of the more general
problem that selection processes that generate the body of decided appeals, and
the way they change over time, make win rates very difficult to interpret.
IV
CONCLUSION
In the domain of precedential decisions, final-judgment appeals dominated
interlocutory appeals prior to 2000. The number of both published and
unpublished decisions grew steeply in the wake of Rule 23(f), and interlocutory
appeals contributed the lion’s share of this growth. However, interlocutory
appeals have not come to dominate final-judgment appeals. Interlocutory and
final-judgment appeals were in rough parity in the 2002–2017 period. After
CAFA was passed in 2005, the number of decisions in cases seeking certification
of state claims only also grew steeply. Finally, we observed that final-judgment
appeals in (b)(3) classes are far from aberrant—they constitute a significant
portion of all final-judgment appeals in 2002–2017—but that (b)(3) issues are
materially more likely to appear in interlocutory appeals.
Prior to Wal-Mart, interlocutory appeals were far more frequently used to
reverse grants of certification than to reverse denials. After Wal-Mart the trend
reversed, and by 2017 reversal rates were comparable for grants and denials of
certification by district courts. The picture looked broadly similar for finaljudgment appeals. The estimated probability of pro-certification outcomes grew
steeply over about the last decade of our data, a period during which many
commentators (often citing Wal-Mart and Comcast) have regarded the legal
environment as hostile to certification.92 Interestingly, after around 2010,
increasingly pro-certification outcomes on Republican-majority panels
contributed to this development, joining an already ongoing pro-certification
trend on Democratic-majority panels. Statistical models show that, in the period
during which both Wal-Mart and Comcast were governing law, the defendant
advantage in achieving reversal disappeared, and there was a higher probability
of pro-certification outcomes than before.
Finally, we observed that in the mid- to late-1990s in published cases, and the
early 2000s in all cases, Democratic- and Republican-majority panels grew
markedly more polarized on certification issues (measured as the distance
between their probabilities of pro-certification outcomes). This polarization was
sustained even while both grew more pro-certification. This temporal pattern of
polarization is similar to what we found in earlier work on the Supreme Court in
private enforcement cases in general, and in Federal Rules cases in particular. In
92. See, e.g., Klonoff, supra note 48, at 753–54, 774; Klonoff, supra note 16, at 976–77.
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the statistical models, we observe that party has a larger effect in interlocutory
appeals (the gap between Democratic and Republican-majority panels is larger).
Thus, the growing number of interlocutory appeals under Rule 23(f) in the 2000s
contributed to the polarization we document. In this sense, one consequence of
Rule 23(f) was to inject more ideology into class certification on the U.S. Courts
of Appeals.
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APPENDIX
In all of the logistic models reported below, the following control variables
were included:
• Trial court outcome: Indicator variable reflecting whether the trial court
certified the class (or portion of the class) that is under consideration by
the court of appeals.
• Trial judge sitting by designation: Indicator variable recording whether
there was a trial judge sitting by designation on the panel.93
• Defendant type: Non-mutually exclusive indicator variables measuring
whether certification was sought with respect to a federal defendant, state
defendant, business defendant, or other type of defendant.
• Law type: Mutually exclusive indicator variables measuring whether
certification was sought for claims arising under federal law, state law, or
both.
• Class type: Mutually exclusive indicator variables measuring whether
certification was sought for a plaintiff class, a defendant class, or both.
• Policy area: Mutually exclusive indicator variables reflecting policy area.
Our policy classifications are: civil rights-discrimination, civil rightsprisoner, civil rights-other, labor and employment, consumer, product
liability, environmental and toxic substances, antitrust, securities,
insurance, and public benefits. Remaining policy areas each comprised
less than 2% of the data, and we aggregated them into an “other” policy
category.
• Certification versus decertification: Indicator variable recording whether
the court was deciding a motion to certify or a motion to decertify.
• Circuit fixed effects: Circuit fixed effects (dummy variables for each circuit)
account for any time-varying covariates that take the same value for each
judge on a panel within the circuit. This controls for factors that vary
across circuits that are associated with certification, such as circuit
doctrine that may have a pro- or anti-certification slant and variation in
the size and content of caseloads across circuits.
• Publication: Indicator variable in models of both published and
unpublished decisions reflecting whether a decision is precedential.
• Gender composition: Indicator variables measuring where there were one,
two, or three women serving on the panel.94
• Racial composition: Indicator variables measuring where there were one
or two African Americans serving on the panel (there were never three).95

93. We say “trial judge” rather than district judge because judges from the Court of Claims and the
International Court of Trade also sit by designation.
94. We obtained this information from Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789Present, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges [https://perma.cc/6NSX-YD4W].
95. Id.
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Coefficients in logit models cannot be directly interpreted, and thus it is
necessary to compute predicted changes in probability of outcomes associated
with a change in levels or categories of independent variables (such as the change
from pre- to post-Comcast). The predicted probabilities discussed in the paper
are derived from the models in Table A-1. Model A (1967–2017, published cases)
and Model B (2002–2017, all cases) in Table A-1 present the basic models of procertification outcomes with only the main effects of the independent variables of
interest. In these models, the independent variables capture the average
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable over
the period covered by the model, conditional on other covariates.
Table A-1. Logit Model of Certification Outcomes & Reversals
Model A
Outcome
1967–2017
Published
1995
Dummy
Year
Comcast

.52
(.35)
-.05***
(.01)
1.07***
(.27)

Model B
Outcome
2002–17
All Cases

Model C
Outcome
1967–2017
Published

-.003
(.04)
.70**
(.35)

.55
(.35)
-.05***
(.01)
1.08***
(.33)

___

Model D
Outcome
2002–17
All Cases

Model E
Reversal
1967–2017
Published

-.0002
(.04)
.72*
(.42)

1.37***
(.39)
-.06***
(.01)
.85**
(.35)

___

Model F
Reversal
2002–17
All Cases

___
-.02
(.04)
.78*
(.42)

Interloc

-.18
(.17)

.10
(.22)

-.59***
(.22)

-.24
(.30)

1.53***
(.23)

1.47***
(.33)

Democrat
Majority

.62***
(.15)

.99***
(.24)

.33*
(.18)

.64*
(.37)

.46**
(.19)

.66*
(.38)

Dem. Maj *
Comcast

___

___

.02
(.42)

-.04
(.42)

___

___

Dem Maj *
Interloc

___

___

.96***
(.32)

.73*
(.42)

-.91***
(.31)

-.91**
(.45)

___

___

___

.13
(.17)

1.18***
(.30)

___

___

___

-.62
(.42)

-1.19***
(43)

DCt Outcome
DCt Outcome
*
Comcast

___

___

All models include circuit fixed effects, policy area fixed effects, and independent variables measuring
direction of the trial court outcome, trial judge sitting by designation, defendant type (federal government, state government, business, other), law type (federal law, state law, both), type of class for
which certification was sought (plaintiff, defendant, both), whether the motion was for certification
or decertification, and dummy variables measuring whether there were one, two, or three women
serving on the panel, and whether there were one or two African Americans serving on the panel.
Models B, D, and F additionally contain a variable indicating whether the case was published.

N=

1095

586

1095

586

1012

531

Pseudo
R2=

.12

.19

.13

.20

.10

.19

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
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In Models C to F, the focus is on interactions of independent variables, such
as the interaction of interlocutory and Democratic-majority. We discuss the
predicted probabilities associated with the significant interactions of interest in
the body of the paper. While we do not discuss the main effects of the interacted
variables, we note that their meaning changes very significantly relative to their
meaning without the interaction. For example, in models with the interlocutory
variable interacted with Democratic-majority, the interlocutory variable no
longer captures the average effect of interlocutory, but rather captures only the
effect of an appeal being interlocutory (interlocutory=1) when the panel is
majority Republican (Democratic-majority=0), with the reference category being
final-judgment appeals (interlocutory=0) decided by Republican majorities
(Democratic-majority=0).
Models C and D replicate Models A and B, but with the addition of the
interaction of interlocutory with Democratic-majority, and the interaction of
post-Comcast with Democratic-majority. Models E and F then substitute reversal
as the dependent variable. The significant interaction of interlocutory and
Democratic-majority is retained, and the insignificant interaction of Comcast and
Democratic-majority is dropped.
We include in our data certification decisions of settlement-only classes
(which comprise 3.9% of our cases). It is arguable that when plaintiff-objectors
are challenging matters on which named plaintiffs and defendants agree, the
appeal does not present a question that can be appropriately described as pro- or
anti-certification. Our approach to the data is to include all certification questions
rather than selecting cases out of the data based on our expectations about how
they will align with judicial preferences on certification. Nevertheless, we
examined alternative specifications of Models A to D (which have pro- versus
anti-certification as the dependent variable) that included an independent
variable measuring whether the appeal was by a plaintiff-objector. The variable
was insignificant in every model. The independent variables displayed for each
model in Table A-1 remained within the same significance levels, and the
significant variables were associated with very similar magnitudes. Plaintiffobjectors are not affecting our results. In Models E and F (which have reversal
as the dependent variable) we restrict analysis to appeals brought only by
plaintiffs (not including objectors), or only by defendants, because that is called
for by the hypotheses being tested in those models.

